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Abstract
Emergency management is a field in which collaborative activities
are inescapable. Emergency planning and response increasingly in-
volves a diverse array of actors across field (emergency management,
public health, law enforcement, etc.), sector (government, nonprofit,
and for-profit), and level of government (local, state, and federal).
The necessity of collaboration is built into the logic of escalation in
the Stafford Act and the nature of emergency events as boundary
spanning threats. While the necessity of collaboration is clear, the
dynamics of this collaboration are less well understood. This paper
assesses the temporal dynamics of an emergency management network
in a moderately sized community in central Texas. The evolution of
the network between 2000 and 2009 make clear that actors are both
quick to join and to leave the network while the network maintains its
centralized character throughout the time period.
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1 Introduction
Public administration and political science are currently focusing quite a
bit of attention on issues related to political and administrative networks.1
The Public Administration Review devoted an entire special issue to the
subject in 2005 and the American Political Science Association created an
specialized organized section on the subject of political networks. While
attention to collaborative public management and policy networks is high
right now, this is by no means a new subject. The classic argument of the
dominance of iron triangles or policy whirlpools is a network argument -
albeit of a small network (Redford 1969). The counterargument that policy
tends to involve broad and fluid participation in issue networks is also rather
obviously a network construct (Heclo 1978). More recent integrations of the
literature positing changing levels of participation over time and across policy
areas suggest that these networks can evolve over time as characteristics of
individual policy domains change (McCool 1998, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith
1993).
While attention to issues of administrative and policy networks has been a
component of the policy literature for decades, the dynamics of the networks
across time has proven to be a difficult subject to study. Due to extraordinary
demands on data and the necessity of novel inferential techniques for data
involving networks, very little work has engaged issues related to network
change. This paper represents an initial (and tentative) step toward assessing
the evolution of emergency management networks across time - in this case
over a decade involving two major events. The next section (Section 2)will
discuss some of the existing literature on issues related to the incorporation of
new actors into a policy network and the evolution of network characteristics
over time. The result will be a series of propositions about the nature of
emergency management network change. Section 3 will introduce a new data
set on a single policy network over a decade. Over this section, the paper
will assess the evolution of the network over time to assess the fit between
the theoretical expectations in the previous section and the observed changes
in the emergency management network. Finally, Section 4 will provide some
1This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Grant No. CMMI-0927576. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Science Foundation. I would also like to thank Joseph Reed, Warren Eller,
Melanie Gall, and Brian Gerber for their assistance with this project.
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summary thoughts and a discussion of plans to extend on this initial study.
2 Network Recruitment
A driving question of research into policy and administrative networks is the
scope and fluidity of participation. The key characteristic of policy subsystem
approaches to networks was the emphasis on closed and limited participation
by predictable actors (e.g. congressional subcommittees, interest groups, and
agencies). The principle critique of the argument was the participation in
actual policy domains tends to be much more broad and fluid. It was argued
that a large variety of actors may participate within any policy network in-
cluding those envisioned by subsystem theories as well as representatives of
other levels of government and even public interest groups. Furthermore, the
participation level of various actors is thought to change over time with some
actors dropping out of active participation while new actors emerge at differ-
ent time. An issue network represents an extreme version of this open and
fluid network (Heclo 1978). A key question, then, is the scope and fluidity of
participation in actual policy networks. The next subsection will discuss the
issue of participation in emergency management networks specifically. Fol-
lowing that specific discussion, I will discuss some specific propositions from
the literature regarding the evolution of emergency management networks.
2.1 Networks and Emergency Management
Over the past two decades, the importance of collaborative networks has be-
come clear to scholars specializing in emergency management. Emergency
management represents a classic wicked problem (O’Toole Jr 1997). Emer-
gencies tend to cross jurisdictional boundaries due to the geographic scope
and the broad range of consequences they present. For example, Hurricane
Katrina devastated communities across multiple states and mobilizing reac-
tions from a variety of government agencies (emergency management, law
enforcement, transportation, public health, housing and welfare, etc.) and
nongovernmental agencies (the American Red Cross, Walmart, local religious
institutions, etc.).
Among the most prominent voices for research into collaboration and net-
working activities in emergency management has been Louise Comfort. Com-
fort has argued that emergency management networks are best understood
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as self-organizing systems (Comfort 1994). The emphasis in her account is
fluidity of participation and the inability to predict mobilizations ex ante.
Rather than following documented plans or stable expectations, mobiliza-
tion tend to involve an unpredictable set of actors that vary greatly in terms
of prior disaster experience, organizational sector, and other characteristics.
Concluding that mobilization is unpredictable is unsatisfying in a number
of ways. First, it suggests that efforts to plan mobilizations are doomed to
failure. If one can not predict who will be involved - at least in terms of some
core players - then one can not know whom to involve in emergency planning.
Second, to the extent that exercises and other simulations are key preparatory
(and possibly even evaluative) elements of emergency management, if one
can not predict who will mobilize following an emergency event then one
will not know who to include in an exercise. The limited composition of
exercises preceding Hurricane Katrina has been identified as a key cause of
the eventual problems in evacuating residents of New Orleans with limited
access to transportation (Kiefer & Montjoy 2006).
However, the difficulty in predicting which organizations will mobilize in
an emergency may have been overstated. In a study of the mobilization
of evacuation hosting activities in the Dallas/Fort Worth, TX area follow-
ing Hurricane Katrina, Robinson, Berrett & Stone (2006) found that the
mobilization of many organizations was predictable given a series of prior
relationships. Relationships that sometimes had little to do with emergency
management and evacuation hosting activities served as a basis for the emer-
gence of a series of response networks. While there was also evidence of
spontaneous mobilization of organization with no prior membership in emer-
gency management networks, a good part of the network - particularly the
network leadership - involved prior relationships that could easily escape the
attention of emergency management scholars. The case studies collected in
this article provide some hope that relationships can be managed and that
mobilizations can be predicted (within some bounds).
The complexity of the mobilization and management process of emer-
gency management networks has raised important questions about the man-
agement and leadership of these networks. Waugh & Streib (2006) argued
that coordination is difficult within emergency management networks despite
recent attempts to provide structure to the networks through such devices
as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Integrated
Command System (ICS). The difficulties in leadership are accentuated given
the diversity of these networks. Actors from diverse sectors and policy areas
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bring with them a variety of assumptions about the nature of emergencies
and appropriate forms of coordination and communication(Comfort 2007).
2.2 Propositions for Network Evolution
Given the importance of network collaboration to issues of emergency man-
agement, research into the development and evolution of these networks is
essential to the improvement of management of emergency preparedness and
response networks. This paper will focus on expectations surrounding the key
characteristics that distinguish subsystem models from issue network models
of policy networks: scope of participation and fluidity of participation.
In terms of scope of participation, there is no bright line distinguishing
high from low levels of participation. Most of the research has been at the
federal level of policy making complicating predictions at local levels. In-
stead, I will focus on volatility in the number and connectivity of networks
within the sample.
Proposition 1: Emergency management networks will experience volatil-
ity in membership.
Volatility can take on a number of meanings. One can experience volatil-
ity in the aggregate number of network members. However, involving more
organizations may not be as important as increasing representation from di-
verse types of organizations. While I could focus on a number of types, I will
focus on representation of policy sectors (e.g. emergency management, law
enforcement, education, public health, etc.) and private sector organizations.
This focus results in two specified propositions.
Proposition 1a: Emergency management networks will experience volatil-
ity in network size.
Proposition 1b: Emergency management networks will experience volatil-
ity in network diversity (in terms of policy sector representation).
3 Data and Methods
Testing these propositions requires data with a particular set of character-
istics. The dataset must record participation and interconnectivity between
actors within emergency management. Furthermore, the observations must
be ordered so that a time path is clear. Ideally, the time path should
record participation over a number of years, preferably at least a decade
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(Sabatier 1993). Hypothetically, one could conduct interviews or surveys an-
nually over a decade but such efforts are incredibly expensive and rare. The
twin needs of comparable measurement and available data across time are
best (or at least, easiest) served by documentary analysis.
We have selected to use newspaper searches to generate a database of
documents. Our goal was to create a single system for collecting journalistic
coverage of emergency management networks that could be used for a variety
of communities across time. For purposes of this study, we are focusing at-
tention on evacuation related activities (within the entire realm of emergency
management). We elected to search within the Westlaw database using the
substantive search term “evac!”. This will capture all words that begin with
the letters “evac” including evacuation, evacuate, evacuee, and the like. The
Westlaw database allowed us to search all newspapers and news wires - to
ensure we captured local as well as national media sources. The use of media
reports to reconstruct networks was inspired by Comfort’s (2006) study of
response networks to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
We next needed to locate comparable communities. We were interested
in evacuation hosting activities so we identified communities that had recent
(within the last decade) experiences with evacuation hosting activities. We
also choose communities that were relatively similar in terms of population
size. For this reason we chose moderately sized communities rather than the
largest cities where the variances in size are large in absolute terms. For each
community, we added geographic limiters to the substantive search term in-
cluding the major cities and the county in which the community resides. For
example, we looked for articles that included a term starting with “evac” and
also included either “College Station”, “Bryan”, or “Brazos County.” Given
the varying roles that county and city official play in emergency management,
we felt it was essential to search based on city and county.
These searches of the Westlaw database resulted in hundreds of hits for
each year of our sample (2000-2009). 2 Each of these articles were then read
individually to ensure that the article was germane to issues of evacuation.
This eliminated many articles. Some articles included references to enter-
tainment or sporting events in the target community (such as Texas A&M
University sports teams) and coverage of something having to do with an
2Aggregation of the articles to annual sets could be problematic if the division between
December and January were arbitrary. In the case of evacuation hosting, though, almost
all activities are during the hurricane seasons in the Spring and Fall. There is little activity
in the winter and thus calendar years make a reasonable division
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evacuation in a different community. We only selected articles that involved
an evacuation or evacuation hosting activity within the target community.
We then read each of the selected articles to identify all organizations men-
tioned. If two organizations were mentioned within a single article, those
organizations were taken to be “co-mentioned.” We take this to be a low
threshold indicator of association. For each year, then, we have a list of all
mentioned actors and all cases of co-mentions. We use these data to create
a series of annualized maps of the community evacuation management net-
work. I am in the process of collecting data on six communities using this
method. In this paper, I will limit my attention to the data generated by the
study of Brazos Valley, TX. The following sections will describe the evolution
of the Brazos Valley network.
3.1 Brazos County 2000-2004
Brazos County lies in central Texas located between Houston, Dallas, Waco,
and Austin. This community is known as the home of Texas A&M Univer-
sity and lies along a primary evacuation route for communities along the Gulf
Coast of Texas - including Houston and much of East Texas. As a result,
officials in Brazos County had active roles in the evacuations related to Hur-
ricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Hurricane Ike in 2008. This section will
detail the emergence of the network before the massive activation of hosting
activities in 2005.
The initial figures indicate the rudimentary status of the evacuation net-
work in Brazos County in 2000. There are only three actors active in the first
year - with the university serving as a hub connecting the two other actors.
The central position of the university will be consistent throughout the time
period.
In 2001, the scope of the network increased to include a variety of local and
national institutions. National institutions such as FEMA and the Ameri-
can Red Cross appear connected to the university. A few units formally
connected to the university also appear - including the Hazard Reduction
and Recovery Center, the Extension Service, and the emergency response
training unit. A state institution (the Texas Department of Transportation)
also appears along with a separate triad including the Texas A&M Health
Science Center’s School of Rural Public Health, the EPA, and a state natu-
ral resource organization. The two unnamed nodes appearing on the figure
(v2 and v3) represent actors that have appeared previously (in this case, in
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Figure 1: Brazos County Network 2000
2000) but who were not mentioned in 2001. The disappearance of two of the
three actors from 2000 to 2001 speaks to the fluidity in participation in the
network.
A look to Figure 3 shows that the patterns of the university, the central
actor, and many organizations leaving the network after one year continues.
The university connects a cluster of organizations focused on hurricane issues
to a separate cluster of state agencies (the Texas General Land Office, the
Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Ser-
vice) in addition to the FBI. It is remarkable at this point to note the variety
of organizations engaged in issues of evacuation. In addition to the policy
areas listed above (land regulation, public safety/homeland security, law en-
forcement, and meteorology) there is a state level public health organization.
While the network is centralized, it is quite diverse. Furthermore, many of
the actors present in 2001 drop out for 2002 indicating continued fluidity.
The take-up of new actors exceeds the departure rate, so the network grows.
However, the growth is despite a significant departure rate.
As Figure 4 indicates, the size of the network collapsed in 2003. The
number of actors mentioned dropped off. The university’s central role is
persistent - as is the relative diversity of policy fields. Again we have repre-
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Figure 2: Brazos County Network 2001
Figure 3: Brazos County Network 2002
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Figure 4: Brazos County Network 2003
sentatives (albeit different actual organizations) of law enforcement, public
health, fire protection, emergency management, transportation, and mete-
orology. The number of lapsed participants is adding up and exceeds the
number of current participants.
The network in 2004 continues to be quite small and the scope of organi-
zation shrinks. With the university again at the center, now the network only
includes emergency management, transportation, and meteorology organiza-
tions. There is less representation by public health, law enforcement and
fire protection organizations. This limited network is an interesting baseline
before what will be an incredibly active year.
3.2 Brazos County 2005
2005 represents an important year for studying the dynamics of networks.
With the two major hurricanes (Katrina and Rita) both producing signifi-
cant Gulf Coast evacuations that affected the studied community, this year
served as the first of the recent tests of the evacuation hosting network in
Brazos County. For the most part, scholarship and practitioner guidance
on evacuation planning had focused on the process of getting people out of
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Figure 5: Brazos County Network 2004
harms way (cf. Perry & Greene 1981). For example, the use of counter-flow
lanes were part of what was widely considered a successful process of getting
the residents of New Orleans who had access to personal automobiles and
chose to evacuate out of the city before landfall(the evacuation of people
without access to personal transformation or who did not want to evacuate
was another matter) (Litman 2006). Without a great deal of guidance on
how to host evacuees, many organizations had to make up their own rules
and processes as they went along. As a result, many organizations reached
out for assistance and guidance from other organizations. The result is a
larger and more diverse network.
All of the actors who were mentioned in the network in 2005 are named
though many of them are not connected to any other organizations. This
does provide some indication that connections are not trivial. Even with the
increased number of actors, the university is still the most central actor -
though of a disconnected network. Many of the policy areas that had ap-
peared in the network in previous year, many of whose representatives had
lapsed from membership, reappear in the network in this year. For instance,
public health organizations reappear. There are also organizations that rep-
resent new sectors and policy areas. Housing agencies appear; as do private
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Figure 6: Brazos County Network 2005
sector organizations (and their representatives) that provided services during
the evacuation including La Quinta and the Small Business Administration.
Predictably, 2005 included both the largest and most diverse network
yet. The extraordinary demands placed on the evacuation hosting network
brought in a wide variety of actors. This raised an interesting question for
those in emergency management organizations and other long time members
of the network, how long would the actors stay?
3.3 Brazos County 2006-2007
The Brazos County network in 2006 and 2007 represents a period of recovery
and re-evaluation. While Brazos County was not directly affected by the
storms of 2005, the potential for such massive evacuation hosting activities
in the future forced members to identify effective practices and partnerships
while avoiding activities that were problematic. As one example, a member
of the evacuation hosting network complained about some of the sponta-
neously organized smaller hosting sites. Some sites never registered with
the Red Cross or any local emergency management organization. The well-
intentioned sites simply advertised directly on the road side and took in
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Figure 7: Brazos County Network 2006
evacuees. When the evacuees needed to stay longer than a couple of days,
the spontaneous sites were ill-prepared to care for the evacuees. As a result,
care for the evacuees dwindled and requests for assistance began to burden
the formal sites (where the addition of the evacuees would not have been a
problem if they have simply started at one of the recognized hosting sites)
(Interviewee 2009).
Figure 7 shows a dramatic retraction of the size of the evacuation network
following the 2005 hurricane season. Many of the organizations present in
most pre-2005 years are still present including the central node of the univer-
sity. Representatives of fire, environment, and public health are still present.
The community EOC is also present representing local emergency manage-
ment while state and federal officials are absent. The ring of unnamed nodes
dramatically illustrates the number of actors who have been present in the
network previously but who have exited the network for 2006.
Figure 8 represents the network in 2007. The network continues to shrink
with only a few players remaining. Some organizations pop up (like the
returning NOAA); some anomalously (like ATMOS energy). Most of the
players represent university units (the university itself, the Hazards Center,
the Homeland Security Center, and the TEES unit with strong ties to the
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Figure 8: Brazos County Network 2007
university). The Texas National Guard and Office of Homeland Security (a
unit of the previously involved Department of Public Safety) indicate some
state participation in the network.
3.4 Brazos County 2008-2009
The Fall of 2008 presented a test of what had been learned following the
2005 hurricane season. There were two significant evacuations of communi-
ties along the Western Gulf Coast - associated with Hurricanes Gustav and
Ike. While neither of these hurricanes produced the damage of Hurricane
Katrina, the evacuation response and the demand for hosting was vigorous.
Figure 9 illustrates the network for this activated hurricane evacuation net-
work. Despite the dwindling participation in the network from 2006 through
2007, participation in 2008 expands beyond 2005 levels in sheer number as
well as diversity. Representatives of emergency management, public health,
and university units are present as always (and the university remain the
central figure). The public health network is particularly robust. Despite
the university being the central network actor, there is a new core that in-
cludes a number of emergency management and public health organizations
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Figure 9: Brazos County Network 2008
(appearing just below the university in Figure 9). We also see a reemergence
of welfare organizations (a food bank) and some actors representing private
hosting facilities (hotels).
The final figure (Figure 10) shows another collapse of participation in
the year following a major activation. While the hurricanes mobilize a large
number of actors, those actors fade back out of the network during periods
without activation. The data for this year are complicated by a local evacua-
tion event in the summer of 2009. A chemical release forced an evacuation of
one part of the county - resulting in hosting activation in other parts of the
county. The company that experienced the chemical release (the El Dorado
Chemical Company) appears for that reason. Local emergency management
and fire officials also remain in the network - in part in reference to this local
evacuation event. The university retains its central role.
4 Conclusion
This work is preliminary, so I am hesitant to infer much from the networks
reported above. In this conclusion, I will discuss some candidate lessons from
these data followed by discussions of the significant limitations of the data
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Figure 10: Brazos County Network 2009
and potential extensions of the study.
4.1 Preliminary Lessons
There are two preliminary inferences from the evolution of the Brazos County
network. First, the central actors across all years was the large, nationally
prominent university within the community. While a second clique of actors
emerged in the 2008 evacuation network, the university is the hub of most of
the media reported connections. Second, the network of actors is extremely
fluid. The number of lapsed actors accumulates quickly throughout the time
period. Even when aggregating up to policy sector representation (public
health organizations, transportation organizations, etc.), there is consider-
able fluidity within the network with sectoral representatives entering and
leaving the network. The network mobilized a large number of organizations
representing sectors - but the network collapsed back to a small number of
participants between large events.
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4.2 Data Limitations
The primary lessons of the paper should be read with a significant degree of
skepticism. There is a significant limitation of the data that may be playing a
central role in defining the dynamics of the reported networks - independent
of actual collaborative behaviors in the evacuation hosting network. These
data involve media reports of evacuation hosting activity. The data are only
as reliable as the initial media reports. Factors that influence media atten-
tion will affect the data generation process. This may explain a great deal
of the centralization of the university. Texas A&M University is the largest
and most prominent organization in the community by general measures of
media attention. It could be this general salience serves as an attractor of
evacuation network media attention to such a degree that it exaggerates the
university’s actual role in evacuation hosting activities. If media reports re-
flect factors independent of actual evacuation activity, the resulting networks
will be biased. Based on interviews within the community, this is a signifi-
cant problem in that the media reported networks do not reflect the image
of the network from the perspective of interview respondents interview. The
biases inherent in media reports may also serve to exaggerate the changes in
network size. When evacuation hosting is salient, the media is more likely
to cover it. The greater predisposition towards coverage may lead to both
greater diversity of coverage and an increase in the number of covered actors.
The fluidity in terms of size and diversity, then, may be spuriously related (or
at least exaggerate by) the predisposition to cover evacuation organizations
during large events.
It may also be the case that the specific community studied here may
not be representative of all communities. Brazos County is a distinctive
community in a number of ways: its geographic proximity to Houston (within
this sample both a significant evacuating population and one of the largest
hosting communities), its presence within a specific state evacuation planning
context, its dominance by a large university, etc. Given the characteristics
of community, one should hesitate to generalize from this single case study.
4.3 Potential Extensions
In the presence of these significant limitations on the media reported network
data, a key extension will be to apply the method to other communities and
to collect data using other strategies. The research project that started
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with the Brazos County network will continue to collect comparable data
for five other, similarly-sized communities. The diversity of cases should
provide some protection from over-generalization. Only phenomena within
the networks that are general across communities (from various states, etc.)
will be a sound basis for generalization. I will have to chart carefully the
consistent signals present within each of the networks - and discount the
signals that are present in only one or a few of the networks.
It will also be important to compare media generated data to data col-
lected through other strategies. I plan to conduct parallel network studies us-
ing interview data, survey data, formal plan data, and situation report/after
action report data. These other strategies provide potentially disconfirming
tests of the various hypotheses related to evacuation hosting networks. Each
of these other strategies have their own limitations. The interview data, for
example, may be likely to exaggerate the role of the interviewees. The formal
plans are not updated frequently enough to capture changes on an annual
basis. In Brazos County, there will have been three operative emergency
plans over this decade (one of which was still in the approval stage in late
2009). This data will not be as useful in tracking changes in participation
over time. With limitations like these, the combination of inferences from
varying data sources will be a difficult process requiring great care.
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